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A model of a two-sided market with two horizontally differentiated platforms and
multihoming on one side is developed. In contrast to recent contributions, it is shown that
platforms do not necessarily generate all revenues on the multihoming side by charging a
higher price. Also, whether platforms' pricing structures favor exclusivity over multihoming
is ambiguous.
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In two-sided markets platforms try to bring together two groups of customers
each of which is interested in the participation by the other side.1 In most
two-sided markets, multihoming by at least one side plays an important role.
Multihoming (unlike singlehoming) describes a situation where customers
join more than one platform.
Multihoming is a distinctive feature of most two-sided markets. It is present
in markets like apartment brokerage, media, online shopping portals, operat-
ing systems, payment cards, video game consoles, etc.2 These industries gen-
erate revenues of several hundred billions of dollars each year. Platforms often
generate most of their revenues from the multihoming side. Apartment bro-
kers, for instance, tend to charge (potentially) multihoming buyers/renters
and not singlehoming owners. Contrary to that, the online auction house
eBay only charges singlehoming sellers a certain percentage of the sales
price when a transaction takes place whereas (potentially) multihoming buy-
ers receive services for free.3 Given the importance of the markets involved
and the diﬀerent pricing structure that can be observed, it is necessary to
better understand the relevant factors that aﬀect pricing decisions by ﬁrms.
The issue of (endogenous) multihoming has been dealt with by a number of
authors (Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003), Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004),
Armstrong (2005), Armstrong and Wright (2005), and Roson (2005)). These
papers diﬀer from the present one with respect to the aspect of diﬀerentia-
tion on the multihoming side. Without diﬀerentiation, all customers on one
side make the same decision and platforms generate all revenues on the mul-
tihoming side by charging a higher price and thus leaving it with no surplus
from trade. Contrary to that, the present note shows that due to prod-
uct diﬀerentiation (i.e. heterogenous preferences among customers), partial
multihoming arises. As a result, platforms neither always charge this side a
higher price nor leave it without any surplus from trade. This is intuitive as
partial multihoming implies that platforms are no longer local monopolists
on the multihoming side which results in a price reduction. However, when
it comes to the relative prices on both sides, there are ambiguous eﬀects as
to whether platforms prefer multihoming (which is equal to lowering the re-
spective price even more in order to boost overall demand) or whether they
do not (which is equal to making services more exclusive).
Belleﬂamme and Peitz (2006) simultaneously developed a model which partly
follows the same logic and setup as the present one. However, their focus is
1For an introduction, see, e.g., Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2005).
2For these and other examples, see Evans (2003).
3See www.ebay.com.
1diﬀerent as they look at the implications of diﬀerent platform types (free/not-
for-proﬁt/public vs. for-proﬁt) for the incentives to innovate. They ﬁnd that
for-proﬁt intermediation may increase or decrease investment incentives de-
pending on which side of the market singlehomes. Moreover, Poolsombat
and Vernasca (2006) also simultaneously developed a similar version of the
present model with two heterogeneous groups of agents who diﬀer in their
valuation of the network beneﬁt. They also ﬁnd that platforms do not always
generate all their revenues from the partially multihoming side but their re-
sults diﬀer from the ones presented here in some important aspects.
In the next section, the model is presented. The third section discusses the
results.
2 The model
The basic setup follows Armstrong (2005) who uses a Hotelling (1929) speci-
ﬁcation. Platform 1 is located at 0 and platform 2 is located at 1. Platforms
incur marginal costs ck per side-k customer served. Fixed costs are normal-
ized to 0.
There are two groups of customers (k ∈{ a,b}) with mass 1 each. Customers
are uniformly distributed on the linear city of unitary length. Unlike Arm-
strong (2005) side-b customers are assumed to have the opportunity to multi-
home whereas side-a customers singlehome.4 Utility for some side-a (side-b)
customer who is located at a distance Δa (Δb) from platform i (i ∈{ 1,2})
and who joins this platform (and possibly platform j)i sd e ﬁ n e da sf o l l o w s
(where nk




















i − tbΔb when singlehoming
βb + αb − pb
i − pb
j − tb when multihoming.
(2)
Note that joining platform j only leads to a travel distance of 1 − Δk and
that na
j =1− na
i as well as nb
j =1− nb
i,s where nb
i,s denotes the number of
side-b customers who join platform i exclusively. Moreover, customers derive
some basic utility βk which is independent of whether they join one or two
platform(s). Both sides beneﬁt from the participation of the other side the
4This setup is justiﬁed for the examples of apartment brokerage and online auctioning
mentioned before: Placing an object with two or more platforms is not possible (from a
legal point of view) as it cannot be rented/sold to more than one renter/buyer.
2extent of which is measured by the two-sided network externality αk, αk > 0.
Customers incur linear transportation costs tk per unit of distance traveled
(tk > 0). The market is depicted in Figure 1.
0 1












Figure 1: Diﬀerentiated two-sided market with partial multihoming
Before turning to the equilibrium analysis, the following assumptions are
made:
Assumption 1 βk is suﬃciently high such that the market is covered on
both sides.
Assumption 2 ta >α a.
This assumption is due to Armstrong and Wright (2005)5 and ensures that
side-a customers have indeed no incentive to multihome.
Assumption 3 tb + cb <
αa + αb
2
< 2tb + cb.
This assumption ensures that multihoming demand does not exceed 1 and
that the market is covered on side b.
Assumption 4 8tatb >α a2 + αb2 +6 αaαb.
This is the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a market-sharing equilib-
rium with multihoming to exist.
Turning to the equilibrium analysis, the indiﬀerent side-a customer is de-
termined in the standard way by equating the utility derived from joining
platform 1 and 2, respectively, and solving for the location variable. The
same is done on side b for the two indiﬀerent customers who are indiﬀerent
5See their assumption A2. They provide a proof for this assumption in their Lemma 1.
3between joining only one of the two platforms on the one hand and joining
both on the other hand.


























































2tb (tatb − αaαb)
. (5)





to prices and setting the resulting ﬁrst-order conditions equal to 0 leads to
a system of equations with four unknowns.6 Solving for (symmetric) prices
yields:
Proposition 1 With the possibility of multihoming for side-b customers,



















Hence, platforms charge side-a customers the Hotelling (1929) price ta + ca
which is reduced by a term reﬂecting the importance of the network exter-
nalities involved. On the second side, platforms charge a price consisting
of—like in previous contributions without diﬀerentiation on the multihom-
ing side7—a monopolistic term cb
2 + αb
4 (assuming that each side-b customer
reaches half the customers on the other side which implies a gross willing-
ness to pay of αb
4 ) which is, however, adjusted downward due to the network
externality brought about by the other side.8
Comparing equilibrium prices yields:
6Note that the second-order conditions are satisﬁed due to Assumption 4.
7This is not the case in the Poolsombat and Vernasca (2006) model as they assume
equal transportation costs on both sides.
8See also Belleﬂamme and Peitz (2006).




Hence, partial multihoming may lead to a situation where platforms will not
always generate all revenues from the multihoming side by setting a higher




4tb  0, ∂F
∂αb = −tb+3αa+2αb−2cb
4tb < 0
(due to Assumption 2), ∂F
∂ta =1> 0, and ∂F
∂tb =
αb(3αa+αb−2cb)
4tb2 > 0 (due to
Assumption 2).


















αa + αb − 2cb
4tb . (10)
Due to Assumptions 2 and 4, 1
2 <n b
i < 1 holds, i.e. some side-b customers




















αa2 +6 αaαb + αb2
16tb .10 (11)
3 Discussion
The pricing decision here is in contrast to a competitive-bottleneck11 scenario
without diﬀerentiation on the multihoming side which is the driving force be-
hind the results in the contributions mentioned in the introduction. There,
once the singlehoming side is attracted by the platforms, the latter have some
form of local monopoly power to connect the multihoming side to the single-
homing base. This means that the multihoming side is left with no surplus
9Unlike in the Poolsombat and Vernasca (2006) model, this is not necessarily related
to the scope of multihoming. They derive this result only for a low degree of multihoming
by agents with a high network beneﬁt. Here, a large ta is suﬃcient.
10Note that the proﬁt increases with the costs on the multihoming side. This is reminis-
cent of the result in Caillaud and Jullien (2003) where the proﬁt increases with an increase
in the cost for the singlehoming side.
11See Armstrong (2002) and Wright (2002) for telecommunication services as well as
Armstrong (2005) and Armstrong and Wright (2005) for two-sided markets.
5from trade. Due to the lack of diﬀerentiation, all—if any—agents on one
side multihome. On the other hand, singlehoming customers beneﬁt from an
increased competition among platforms to get them on board.
The local monopoly element is still present here. However, due to diﬀerenti-
ation on the multihoming side, there is only partial multihoming, i.e. some
customers do not multihome because of the increased overall transportation
costs.12 This means that customers are no longer captive which reduces plat-
forms’ local monopoly power. As a result, instead of leaving customers with
no surplus from trade, the price for side-b customers may be lower than the
one for side-a customers.
Consider ﬁrst the implications of an increase in tb which makes multihoming
less attractive. There are two opposing strategic considerations: First, it may
make sense for platforms to reduce their price on the multihoming side in
order to increase their demand and boost their attraction on the other side.
Second, less multihoming means that there are more singlehoming customers
left on the multihoming side. Singlehoming customers, however, can only be
accessed through the respective platform which makes the platforms’ services
more exclusive. Thus, it is possible to charge the singlehoming side a higher
price. From the equilibrium prices, it becomes clear that the second eﬀect is
stronger which means that exclusivity is more important than demand ex-
pansion and that multihoming customers are less valuable. Not surprisingly,
this is true for an increase in ta and a decrease in αb too.
However, the opposite may be true when considering an increase in αa which
leads to a decrease in prices on both sides. The (exclusive) singlehoming
side beneﬁts from the fact that an increase in αa makes the externality rel-
atively more important compared to ta, i.e. competition is increased. With
respect to relative prices, the following reasoning applies: If tb is very large
(> 3αb), i.e. if there are hardly any multihoming customers, the price de-
crease is stronger on the multihoming side. In such a situation, delivering
a great number of side-b customers is more important to the singlehoming
side. Hence, it makes sense for platforms to increase the overall demand on
the potentially multihoming side through a greater price cut. This is in con-
trast to the model of media markets by Ambrus and Reisinger (2006) where
multihoming viewers are always less valuable.
12See also Ambrus and Reisinger (2006) and Poolsombat and Vernasca (2006) as well
as the setup by Doganoglu and Wright (2006) with two diﬀerent types of customers.
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